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Abstract 
Based on the non-structural model – disequilibrium approach (Goddard and Wilson, 2009), this paper 
presents an empirical assessment of the degree of competition within the Vietnamese banking system 
from 1999 to 2009. We examine a greater number of environmental covariates and different dependent 
variables compared to previous applications of this model. Moreover, we use lagged input prices (to 
avoid endogeneity) and exclude assets (to avoid specification bias) in our models. The results indicate 
that the Vietnamese banking system operates in a monopolistic environment. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In the last two decades there has been extensive research on banking reforms in Central and Eastern 
Europe (CEE) – see Fries and Taci (2005); Bonin et al. (2005) and Staikouras et al. (2008). The common 
theme of these studies was to examine bank efficiency and the role of bank ownership. Only a few 
studies analysed the market structure in which commercial banks operate (Nathan and Neave, 1989 
and DeBandt and Davis, 2000). Particular emphasis was given to the privatisation and the role of 
foreign banks in the newly established banking system. However, there is limited research on the 
banking system in less developed economies. In particular, there are only a few studies on the 
Vietnamese banking system that provide a deep analysis and policy implications for the specific 
transformation process adopted by the Vietnamese government in the early 1990s. The specific 
approach applied by the Vietnamese authorities gives us an opportunity to compare the differences 
between the transition process in CEE and Vietnam. Such knowledge deepens our understanding of 
the optimal strategies that should be adopted by the authorities in other less developed economies. 
 
Our study contributes to the research on competitiveness of the banking sector in emerging and 
developing economies (Claessens and Laeven, 2004; Gelos and Roldos, 2004). We endeavour to 
provide a broader picture about bank competition in Vietnam. The main novelty of our study is the 
application of the non-structural model – disequilibrium approach introduced by Goddard and Wilson 
(2009). We estimate H-statistics using models that exclude assets (to avoid specification bias) and 
include lagged input prices (to avoid endogeneity). We examine the ‘system’ and ‘difference’ 
generalised method of moments (GMM) estimators with both ‘one-step’ and ‘two-step’ specifications 
based on Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998). The inclusion of time period dummy 
variables for all periods in addition to economic covariates affects the precision of coefficient 
estimates for some specifications. Hence, a general-to-specific method (GSM) will be applied to 
remove redundant time period dummy variables in each model in an attempt to improve the 
efficiency of estimation and obtain meaningful H-statistics. We also assess whether the H-statistics 
obtained from the dynamic specification motivated by the disequilibrium approach are valid for 
inference. Furthermore, we employ a unique database of 48 Vietnamese commercial banks from 1999 
to 2009. Such a database enables us to assess the impact of the main structural changes of the last 
decade and the results of this analysis provide a better understanding of the main differences of the 
Vietnamese banking system from other (transition) economies.  
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The paper is structured as follows. The next section details developments in the Vietnamese banking 
system while Section 3 explores a brief review of the previous empirical literature of the non-
structural model. Section 4 focuses on methodology and data. Empirical results are presented in 
Section 5 and Section 6 gives conclusions. 
 
2. The Vietnamese banking system  
 
The first stage of the banking reform in Vietnam was similar to those in other transition economies, 
that is, mono-banking was dismantled and replaced by a two-tier banking system in 1986. It is 
important to note that the reform in Vietnam was launched earlier than the reform in some CEE 
countries. However, Vietnamese banks operate in a different economic environment. In particular, the 
geographical location has been a limiting factor in the speed of its development. Although the Asian 
financial crisis in 1997 did not have such dramatic negative externalities as in other countries in south-
east Asia it still reduced economic growth in Vietnam. The capital inflow was much lower compared 
with CEE countries in the 1990s. The capital account was fully controlled which discouraged foreign 
investors to invest in Vietnam in terms of FDI and portfolio investment. Furthermore, a number of 
Asia-Pacific countries liberalised their domestic financial sectors in the 1980s, making apparent the 
large interest differential between domestic and world interest rates; this provided an incentive to 
evade capital controls. In Vietnam, nevertheless, domestic interest rate ceilings supported stringent 
controls over foreign borrowings, enabling the State Bank of Vietnam (SBV) to regulate flows of short-
term capital more efficiently (Leung and Le, 1998, p.125). Another explanation for the minor effect of 
the Asian financial crisis on the country was that the weakly-developed financial market did not attract 
much foreign capital in the first place (Kokko, 1999, p. 84). 
 
In Table 1 we present information about the development of Vietnamese commercial banks (SBV, 
2009). Nguyen and Stewart (2013) provide a detailed description of this development. It is evident that 
the number of joint stock commercial banks increased rapidly after 1990. Nevertheless, state owned 
commercial banks still dominate the market.1 Non-state owned commercial banks include joint stock 
                                                 
1
 Nguyen and Stewart (2013) showed that three out of five state owned commercial banks accounted for 45% of customer deposits, 41% 
of total assets and 51% of customer loans of the banking system in 2009. 
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commercial banks, branches of foreign banks, joint venture commercial banks and foreign commercial 
banks.2 In Vietnam, as in other CEEs during the transition period, joint stock commercial banks 
perform better than state owned commercial banks. Joint stock commercial banks have achieved 
average returns on equity between 15% and 30% from 1999 to 2009 (SBV, 2009). The growth and 
expansion of foreign banks have also been solid. The number of branches of foreign banks increased 
from 18 banks in 1995 to 48 banks in 2009. However, the role of those banks in the Vietnamese 
banking system is rather marginal. The size of these foreign branches is relatively small compared to 
domestic banks. Data on loans, assets, deposits, capital and non-performing loans of the Vietnamese 
banking system (state owned commercial banks and non-state owned commercial banks) from 1999 
to 2009 are presented in Table 2. In general, loans, assets, deposits and capital increased gradually 
over the period. Vietnamese commercial banks had a high volume of non-performing loans, 
particularly during the 1990s; however these generally decreased from 1999 to 2009. Non-performing 
loans of non-state owned commercial banks are typically lower than those of state owned commercial 
banks (Matousek et al., 2013). 
 
The global financial crisis of 2008 caused a sharp economic slowdown and property boom collapse in 
Vietnam and many small banks experienced serious liquidity and solvency problems during this period. 
This led to interventions by the SBV. The reduced lending capacity of the banking sector is one factor 
that contributed to a sharp slowdown of credit growth. Tighter regulation, for example by limiting 
interbank lending, has also contributed to this slowdown (Maddock, 2015). 
3. Literature review 
 
Empirical studies that use the non-structural model to establish the extent of contestability in banking 
markets are concerned with drawing inferences about market structure indirectly from observing 
conduct. This is because contestability, which depends on the extent of potential competition, is not 
observable directly (Goddard et al., 2001). Panzar and Rosse (1987) formulated simple models for 
monopolistic, oligopolistic and perfectly competitive markets, and develop a test to discriminate 
between these market structures. The first market model that Panzar and Rosse investigate is 
monopoly. The empirical refutation of monopoly constitutes a rejection of the assumption that the 
                                                 
2
 Foreign commercial banks normally transformed out of branches of foreign banks. Data on assets, loans and deposits of branches of 
foreign banks are very small compared to other banks. Therefore, in our application, non-state owned commercial banks consist of joint 
stock commercial banks, joint venture commercial banks and one foreign commercial bank.  
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revenue of the banks in question is independent of the decisions made by their actual or potential 
rivals. The Panzar and Rosse model demonstrates that under monopoly, an increase in input prices will 
increase marginal costs, reduce equilibrium output and subsequently reduce revenue; hence H will be 
zero or negative. In the case of monopolistic competition, the analysis is based on the comparative 
static properties of the Chamberlain equilibrium model. In equilibrium, interdependence affects the 
structural revenue function, and the bank’s profit finally becomes zero as the conditions of entry and 
withdrawal are unlimited; hence the H-statistic will be smaller than 1.3 In the case of perfect 
competition, under certain conditions both marginal cost and average cost increase without changing 
the optimum amount of the individual bank’s output. If this condition occurs and some banks 
withdraw from the market, the remaining banks would individually face increased demand. This 
increased demand leads to higher prices and revenue which is equal to the increased cost and the H-
statistic is 1 (Matousek et al., 2013).  
 
Bikker et al. (2006b) used the Panzar-Rosse model to investigate more than 18,000 banks in 101 
countries over 16 years. They showed that market power varies with bank size. Large banks have 
substantially more market power than small banks in many of the countries under consideration, 
including the world’s major economies and covering more than 85% of all banks in the sample. Their 
results contradicted the common finding in the empirical Panzar-Rosse literature that competition 
increases with bank size. Furthermore, they also showed that misspecification (as discussed below) of 
the Panzar-Rosse model in the existing literature leads to an incorrect assessment of the relation 
between market power and bank size. Recent studies of non-structural models have used the Arellano 
and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998) dynamic panel estimators. Goddard and Wilson (2009) 
identified the implications for the H-statistic of misspecification bias in the revenue equation arising 
when adjustment towards market equilibrium is partial and not instantaneous. In their simulations, 
the fixed-effect estimator produced a measured H-statistic that is severely biased towards zero. 
Empirical results for the banking sectors of the Group of Seven (G7) countries corroborated their 
principal finding, that a dynamic formulation of the revenue equation was required for accurate 
identification of the H-statistic. Daley and Matthews (2012) employed a dynamic version of the 
Panzar-Rosse model to examine the degree of competition of 11 Jamaican banks during the period 
1998 to 2009. They found that Jamaica's banking market may have been characterised by cartelisation 
                                                 
3 The H-statistic is the sum of the elasticities of the reduced-form revenue function with respect to factor prices (Panzar and Rosse, 
1987). 
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in certain areas of the banking market. With the current trends and challenges in global markets, it is 
apposite that current policy decisions focus on levels of competition within Jamaica's banking sector.  
 
In Vietnam, three previous studies have applied the Panzar-Rosse model to the Vietnamese banking 
system. Bikker et al. (2006a, 2006b) and Bikker and Spierdijk (2009) analysed bank structure in the 
world (with 101 countries including Vietnam) from 1986-2004. Due to data constraints, they only 
investigated banking structure in Vietnam from 1991 to 2004 for 24 banks.4 They calculated the H-
statistic for the Vietnamese banking system as 0.74. They applied only one model for all 101 countries, 
including Vietnam. Further, they could not observe the three input prices directly. Therefore, they 
used the ratio of annual personal expenses to total assets as an approximation for the price of 
personal expenses, and the ratio of other non-interest expenses to fixed assets as a proxy for the price 
of capital expenditure. Matousek et al. (2013) examined the performance of the Vietnamese banking 
system between 1999 and 2009 using a non-structural model assuming an equilibrium approach. This 
is also the first study that uses lagged input prices (to avoid endogeneity) and excludes assets (to avoid 
bias) in a study of the Vietnamese banking system. The H-statistics are between 0.45 and 0.43 
indicating that the Vietnamese banking system operates in monopolistic competition. However, none 
of these studies applied the non-structural model to the Vietnamese banking system using the 
disequilibrium approach.  
 
4. Methodology and data 
 
4.1. Calculation of the H-statistic under the disequilibrium approach 
 
We consider non-structural models based on the Panzar-Rosse specification extended to include a 
lagged dependent variable (according to the disequilibrium approach) of the following empirical form: 
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where, LN(ROAi,t) is bank i’s revenue in period t, which is measured in two ways: the natural logarithm 
of revenue )( ,tiREVLN  and the natural logarithm of interest income )( ,tiINTLN . Also included is 
                                                 
4 The total number of observations for Vietnam that they use is only 135 whereas our maximum sample size is 376 observations. 
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Based upon the disequilibrium approach the H-statistic that is used to determine the degree of 
competition is calculated from (1) using: 
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From equation (2), if H ≤ 0 the market is a monopoly, if 0 < H < 1 the market is in monopolistic 
competition and if H = 1 the market is in perfect competition.5  
 
4.2. Models with and without assets 
 
Many previous empirical studies include among the controls the log of total assets, )( ,tiTALN , to 
measure size or some other similarly defined measure of bank size; and many studies also scale the 
dependent variables with total assets ( tiTA , ), that is: 
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. However, Bikker 
et al. (2006a) pointed out that it is incorrect to estimate a revenue elasticity using a specification that 
includes a quantity-type variable among the controls, or using a specification which, through rescaling, 
converts a revenue variable into a price-type variable. In fact, if )( ,tiTALN appears among the controls, 
                                                 
5
 Bikker et al. (2012) discussed the problems associated with interpreting H according to these rules. However, they concluded that an 
appropriately specified revenue equation can be used to test the degree of market power using the sign of H. Spierdijk and Shaffer 
(2015) demonstrated that H > 0 is not inconsistent with substantial market power as the traditional interpretation suggested and 
cautioned over such an interpretation of the H-statistic. However, our results show that 𝐻 ≤ 0 and is therefore not in the H > 0 category.  
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then it is immaterial whether the dependent variable is unscaled (not divided by total assets) or scaled 
(divided by total assets). In either case the coefficients on the factor input prices (𝛿1, 𝛿2, 𝛿3) should be 
interpreted as output price elasticities and not as revenue elasticities. The model is misspecified if 
assets are included and inference regarding market structure is invalid. Hence, on the left hand side of 
the models, the dependent variables are )( ,tiREVLN and )( ,tiINTLN instead of 
tiTA
REV
LN
,






 and
tiTA
INT
LN
,






, respectively. Further, )( ,tiTALN is not included on the right hand side of our models 
following Goddard and Wilson (2009) and Bikker et al. (2012).6  
 
4.3. Models with current and lagged input prices 
 
Simultaneity is a dual direction of causality in a system of equations which violates the assumption 
that the explanatory variables and equation’s error term are uncorrelated. Variables in a regression 
can violate this assumption for several reasons, including omitted variable bias, measurement error 
and simultaneity/reverse causation. Models including the current values of input prices might suffer 
from simultaneity (endogeneity) bias between input prices and the dependent variables (revenue and 
interest income). One means of assessing whether or not one or more of the input prices (LN(IE/FF), 
LN(PE/TE) and LN(CE/FA)) suffers from endogeneity is to compare regressions using current input 
prices with those including lagged input prices - see Shaffer (2004) and Goddard and Wilson (2009). 
Large differences in the estimated coefficients (and therefore H-statistics) using models with current 
input prices and using models with lagged input prices is taken as an indication of the endogeneity of 
input prices. Results summarised in Table 7 generally indicate large differences in the coefficients on 
current and lagged input prices and therefore H-statistics. We, therefore, focus on the models 
employing lagged input prices in Tables 3 – 6 in order to ensure valid inference. 
 
4.4. Estimation 
 
Econometric problems may arise from estimating equation (1) using panel data. These include the 
process being dynamic, with current realisations of the dependent variable being influenced by its past 
values, and that the idiosyncratic disturbances may have individual-specific patterns of 
                                                 
6
 In Table 7 we summarise the results for models that both include and exclude assets for comparison purposes.  
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heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. To address these issues a GMM estimator, such as that 
introduced by Arellano and Bond (1991) and those discussed by Roodman (2009), may be used. The 
difference and system GMM estimators can be applied using either the one-step method (with robust 
coefficient standard errors) or the two-step method (with Windmeijer, 2005, small sample corrected 
coefficient standard errors).7   
 
We consider both the one-step GMM estimator (with robust coefficient standard errors) and the two-
step GMM estimator. A downward bias afflicts the standard errors calculated by the two-step method, 
however, using Windmeijer (2005) corrected standard errors with two-step GMM greatly reduces this 
problem with biased coefficient standard errors.8 A feasible approximation of Windmeijer’s small 
sample correction for two-step GMM’s coefficient standard errors has been shown to perform well in 
simulations (Roodman, 2009).  
 
The following properties of standard estimators applied to a dynamic model (incorporating a lagged 
dependent variable) that should include cross-sectional fixed-effects will guide the evaluation of our 
estimated models. The (pooled) OLS estimator (without fixed-effects) will suffer from dynamic panel 
bias and will be inconsistent for small T (the number of time periods) in the sense that increasing N 
(the number of cross-sectional units) will not make the estimator consistent.9 The coefficient on the 
lagged dependent variable will be biased upwards if pooled OLS is applied to a dynamic model without 
accounting for fixed-effects in finite samples. The fixed-effects estimator will also suffer from dynamic 
                                                 
7
 The efficient GMM estimator is equivalent to two-stage least squares (2SLS) when the residuals are homoscedastic (with no 
autocorrelation or cross-correlation). If the residuals do not satisfy these assumptions then using some initial consistent estimate of the 
residuals’ variance-covariance matrix (allowing for heteroscedasticity, for example) in the GMM estimator yields the one-step GMM 
estimator. This coefficient estimator will be asymptotically efficient and consistent as long as the initial estimates of the coefficients are 
consistent (even when the number of time-series observations is small). Coefficient standard errors will not be robust to autocorrelation 
and heteroscedasticity however, by using the variance-covariance matrix based upon the one-step estimator’s residuals in the 
appropriate standard error formula, will yield robust standard errors. Using the residuals obtained from the one-step GMM estimator to 
construct a new variance-covariance matrix to be used with the GMM formula yields the two-step GMM estimator. The two-step 
coefficient estimator is asymptotically efficient and robust to whatever heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation and cross-correlation that is 
modelled by the new variance-covariance matrix. Hence, the two-step estimator should yield superior coefficient estimates relative to 
the one-step estimator.  
8
 This arises when the number of instruments is large and can render the two-step estimator useless for inference. Thus, even though 
GMM will be more efficient than 2SLS asymptotically, when errors are non-spherical it may not be so in finite samples because 
reweighting the estimators using the estimated residual variance/covariance matrix may result in over fitting the sample (data mining) 
using GMM. That is, GMM may give too much weight to observations that fit the model and too little to observations that do not fit the 
model.  
9
 Because it is assumed that T is small in panels with small T and large N consistency typically refers to what happens when N tends to 
infinity. When T is large dynamic models retain their consistency property, as occurs when using time-series models. Indeed, when T is 
large the bias and inconsistency will decline and so dynamic panel (endogeneity) bias will not be a major issue. 
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panel bias and inconsistency (as N tends to infinity) when T is small.10 In contrast to pooled OLS, the 
coefficient on the lagged dependent variable will be biased downwards if the fixed-effects estimator is 
applied to a dynamic model in finite samples. Interestingly the bias of the pooled OLS and fixed-effects 
estimators work in opposite directions. We estimate our models with both estimators and use the 
estimated coefficient on the lagged dependent variable to provide a range within which one would 
normally expect the true coefficient to fall.11  
 
In the application of GMM, Sargan and Hansen tests test whether the instruments are exogenous. If 
the residuals are homoscedastic and non-autocorrelated (spherical) the variance covariance matrix is 
essentially a scalar and the two tests are equivalent. However, if the residuals are not spherical the 
Sargan test is inconsistent and Hansen’s J-statistic provides a superior test.12 Further, both tests 
become weaker, in the sense that inference is biased towards accepting the null that the instruments 
are exogenous, as the number of instruments increases. As a guide, if the number of instruments 
exceeds the number of cross-sections (N) in the panel then there are arguably far too many 
instruments (Roodman, 2009). We report the number of instruments and ensure that this number 
does not exceed the number of cross-sectional units (banks). 
 
In our application, we consider both difference and system GMM estimators using both the one-step 
(with robust standard errors) and two-step (with Windmeijer correction) procedures. By using robust 
standard errors we do not assume spherical disturbances and so the Hansen test is our favoured 
method for assessing the validity of instruments. The criteria that we require for a model to be valid 
are: 
 
 The coefficient on the lagged dependent variable estimated by GMM (denoted L1 in the tables) 
must fall in the range of the lagged dependent variable’s coefficient estimated by Ordinary least 
squares (L1 OLS) and by the fixed-effects estimator (L1 FE). 
 There is no second-order autocorrelation, denoted AR(2), or evidence of invalid instruments, 
denoted Hansen (these tests’ probability values should be higher than 0.05). 
                                                 
10
 Similar to pooled OLS, as T increases the bias and inconsistency of the fixed-effects estimator disappears. However, Roodman (2009) 
noted that even when T = 30 substantial bias (20%) can still remain in the estimator. 
11
 We do this in our analysis because T is small so both OLS and fixed-effects estimators are expected to be biased. 
12
 Arellano and Bond (1991) showed that the one-step (two-step) Sargan test over- (under-) rejects the null of valid instruments in the 
presence of heteroscedasticity. Hence, if heteroscedasticity is present the Sargan test applied with the one-step (two-step) estimator 
may indicate the invalidity (validity) of instruments when the instruments are truly valid (invalid). 
11 
 
 The number of instruments is smaller than the number of cross-sectional units. In all of our 
reported models, this criterion is satisfied. 
 The H-statistics should be sufficiently well determined, in the sense that they are not 
insignificantly different from both zero and one, to be usefully informative on the hypothesis of 
interest. 
 
If more than one model satisfies these criteria we choose our favoured specification for inference as 
follows: 
 
 If the test of the null hypothesis that there are no period fixed-effects (H0 period FE) is rejected at 
the 5% level we favour the model including period dummy variables. Otherwise, we prefer the 
one without period dummies. 
 We prefer the model with the smallest coefficient standard error on the lagged dependent 
variable as recommended by Roodman (2009).  
 
We note that the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is significant in all of our reported 
models which justifies our application of GMM using a dynamic specification.  
 
 
4.4. Data 
 
In this paper, annual individual balance sheets and income statements of 48 Vietnamese commercial 
banks from 1999 to 2009 have been collected from the SBV, National Library of Vietnam and individual 
banks. Although the number of banks for which there is data is only half of the total in the Vietnamese 
banking system they account for more than 90% of total customer loans, total customer deposits and 
total assets.13  
 
5. Empirical results 
                                                 
13
 Five of the 48 banks are state owned commercial banks, five are joint stock commercial banks, one is a foreign commercial bank and 
the remaining 37 are joint stock commercial banks. Several banks established in 2008 and 2009 are included in the data. The number of 
records ranged from a low of 17 banks in 1999 to a high of 46 in 2009. Banks also have differing frequencies of years in the data – see 
Table 1. There are sixteen banks with data for all years; twelve banks with 4–8 years of data; fourteen banks with 5–7 years of data and 
five banks with 2–4 years of data (of which three banks were established in 2008 and one bank was founded in 2006). Only one bank 
(which was transformed from a branch of a foreign bank to a foreign commercial bank in 2008) has one year of data.  
12 
 
 
Table 3 reports the estimated revenue equations and associated H-statistics for the Vietnamese 
banking system over the full sample period of 1999 to 2009.14 We use the ‘system’ and ‘difference’ 
estimators with both ‘one-step’ and ‘two-step’ procedures. In the table, 1S (2S) denotes the one (two) 
step system estimator and 1D (2D) indicates the one (two) step difference estimator. The time dummy 
variables from D1999 to D2009 are added to explicitly incorporate period fixed-effects in addition to 
accounting for (eliminating) cross-sectional fixed-effects in the model.15 The rows labelled instruments 
and groups give the number of instruments and cross-sectional units respectively – in all cases the 
number of instruments is below the number of cross-sectional units. The Arellano and Bond test for 
second-order autocorrelation (AR(2)) and Hansen’s test for instrument validity (Hansen) are also 
presented in the table.16 ‘H0 period FE’ denotes the F-test of the null hypothesis that all included 
period fixed-effects dummy variables are jointly redundant. All of the F-tests (in all tables) reject the 
exclusion of the period fixed-effects suggesting that period dummy variables should be kept in the 
models and so the ‘2-way-FE’ specifications are appropriate. The rows labelled L1 OLS and L1 FE give 
the coefficients on the first lagged dependent variable based on the Ordinary Least Squares and fixed-
effects estimates of (1), respectively. The H-statistics are reported in the row labelled “H-statistics” 
along with two t-tests of the hypotheses that the H-statistic is significantly different from both zero 
(H=0) and one (H=1), respectively.17 We also report the Wald test of whether the model has significant 
explanatory power (denoted “Wald test”) and the number of observations (Obs.) at the bottom of the 
table.  
 
The models estimated using ‘LN(REV)’ as the dependent variable are reported in columns 2 to 5 of 
Table 3. The Hansen tests of the ‘difference’ estimators (both being 0.048) show that the instruments 
are invalid. Furthermore, the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable of the model using the two-
step system estimator (0.6926) lies outside the range of this variable’s coefficient estimated by OLS 
(0.8256) and FE (0.7168). Thus, this model is also considered invalid. However, the model estimated 
                                                 
14
 We also summarise the full sample (1999-2009) results in Table 7 as follows: (1) with assets and current input prices; (2) with assets 
and lagged input prices and (3) without assets and with current input prices. Further, the results of the models estimated over the sub-
samples (1999–2003; 2004–2009; five state owned commercial banks and 43 non-state owned commercial banks) using current and 
lagged input prices both with and without assets are also presented in Table 7. 
15 For all models reported in Table 3 (Tables 4 – 6) the two (one) dummies (dummy) D1999 and D2009 (D1999) are (is) automatically 
dropped by the Stata software due to collinearity. 
16
 The Hansen test has a null hypothesis of “the instruments as a group are exogenous”. The Arellano – Bond test for autocorrelation has 
a null hypothesis of no autocorrelation and is applied to the differenced residuals. The test for AR(2) in first differences is important 
because it will detect autocorrelation in levels. These models are regarded as valid when these tests’ p-values are higher than 0.05. 
17
 To estimate t-statistics that test whether the H-statistics are statistically different from to zero or one, we need to calculate the 
coefficients in static long-run equilibrium and their standard errors. The standard error for this t-test is calculated using the formula 
given in De Boef and Keele (2008). 
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using the one-step system estimator is valid according to all of our criteria. Hence, we use the model 
based on the one-step system estimator for inference. The H-statistic (being -1.28) is significantly 
different from one if not significantly different from zero (and is therefore regarded as well 
determined). This suggests that the Vietnamese banking system was in monopoly between 1999 and 
2009 when LN(REV) is the dependent variable.  
 
As for the other variables’ coefficients in this favoured model using LN(REV), the logarithmic interest 
expense per total funds (LN(IE/FF)) has a negative and significant coefficient while personal expense 
per person (LN(PE/TE) and capital expense per fixed asset (LN(CE/FA)) have insignificant coefficients. 
The number of branches (LN(BR)) has a positive and significant coefficient while all other variables are 
insignificant.  
 
The models using LN(INT) as the dependent variable are reported in columns 6 to 9 of Table 3. The 
coefficient on the lagged dependent variable based on the one-step difference estimator is 0.8525 
which is outside of the range of the corresponding variable’s coefficient estimated by OLS (0.8420) and 
FE (0.7642). However, the models using the ‘system’ and two-step difference estimators are valid for 
inference according to all of our criteria except that their H-statistics (ranging from -3.86 to -2.86) are 
not significantly different from both zero and one. Hence, these H-statistics are poorly determined and 
are arguably uninformative. We therefore use a general-to-specific (GSM) type procedure to eliminate 
redundant time period dummy variables in all of the models to find valid specifications with well 
determined H-statistics. Our procedure is loosely based upon the GSM in that we consider the models 
by sequentially deleting dummies based upon their degree of statistical insignificance. 
 
Tables 4 and 5 report the estimated revenue equations and associated H-statistics when LN(INT) is the 
dependent variable after employing the GSM-type procedure to eliminate insignificant time dummy 
variables. The results of the models based on the one-step system estimator are presented in Table 4. 
We eliminate time dummy variables with t-ratios below one in absolute value (D2006 and D2009) and 
report the resulting models in columns 2 (excluding D2009), 3 (excluding D2006) and 4 (excluding 
D2006 and D2009).18 These models are valid according to all of the criteria we employ except that the 
                                                 
18
 The row denoted “H0 redundant period dummies” reports the joint test for the exclusion of the time dummy variables from the 
models. 
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H-statistics are not significantly different from both zero and one and so these results remain 
uninformative for inference.19  
 
The specifications using the two-step difference estimator with LN(INT) as the dependent variable is 
reported in Table 5. We exclude time dummy variables with t-statistics below 0.8 in magnitude (being 
D2007 and D2009) and report the results in columns 2 (excluding D2009), 3 (excluding D2007) and 4 
(excluding D2007 and D2009). These models are valid according to all of our criteria except for the H-
statistics being insignificantly different from both zero and one in all three cases and so these results 
are considered imprecisely estimated and uninformative.  
 
In the specification using the two-step system estimator we exclude time dummy variables with t-
ratios less than one in absolute value, being D2006 and D2009, and report the models in columns 5 
(excluding D2009), 6 (excluding D2006) and 7 (excluding D2006 and D2009) of Table 5. These three 
models are valid according to all of our criteria except the models reported in column 5 and 6 feature 
uninformative and imprecisely estimated H-statistics that are insignificantly different from both zero 
and one. However, the H-statistic of the model that excludes both D2006 and D2009, reported in 
column 7, is precisely estimated in the sense that it is not insignificantly different from both zero and 
one. Overall, we favour this model for inference when LN(INT) is the dependent variable because it is 
the only valid model that is sufficiently precisely estimated to be informative. The H-statistic (being -
2.61) is not significantly different from zero if it is significantly different from one. This indicates that 
the Vietnamese banking system operated in monopoly during the period 1999 to 2009 when LN(INT) is 
the dependent variable. As for the other variables, the logarithmic price cost of funds (LN(IE/FF)) is 
negative and significant. The logarithmic costs of labour (LN(PE/TE)) and fixed assets (LN(CE/FA)) are 
insignificant. All other control variables are generally insignificant except for the number of branches 
(LN(BR)) which is positive and significant.   
 
For comparison purposes and consistency we also apply the GSM-type procedure to specifications 
where LN(REV) is the dependent variable. Table 6 reports these models based on the one-step system 
                                                 
19
 No specifications using the one-step difference estimator that exclude time dummy variables that are valid for inference could be 
found. In particular, all of the coefficients on the first lagged dependent variables (available from the authors on request) fall outside of 
the ranges of the corresponding variable’s coefficients estimated by OLS and FE and so all of these models are regarded as invalid. 
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estimator.20 We exclude time dummy variables with t-ratios less than one in magnitude (being D2006 
and D2009) and present the resulting models in columns 2 (excluding D2009), 3 (excluding D2006) and 
4 (excluding D2006 and D2009) of Table 6. These models are valid according to all of our criteria. The 
H-statistics of these three models are not significantly different from zero, although they are all 
significantly different from one (so are precisely estimated). We prefer the model reported in column 
4 (excluding D2006 and D2009) of Table 6 because it has the lowest standard error for the dependent 
variable of all the models (being 0.075). The H-statistic is -1.36 which is not significantly different from 
zero if it is significantly different from one. This confirms the inference drawn from the results 
reported in Table 3 that the Vietnamese banking system was in monopoly between 1999 and 2009. As 
for the other variables, the logarithmic price cost of fund (LN(IE/FF)) is negative and significant. The 
logarithmic costs of labour (LN(PE/TE)) and fixed assets (LN(CE/FA)) are insignificant. All of the other 
control variables are insignificant except for the number of branches (LN(BR)) which is positive and 
significant.  
 
In summary, the favoured models from our full sample results give an H-statistic that is -1.36 when 
LN(REV) is the dependent variable and -2.61 in the model where LN(INT) is the regressand. Thus, we 
can conclude that the Vietnamese banking system was monopolistic between 1999 and 2009.  
 
Table 7 presents a summary of further results obtained from the non-structural model using the 
disequilibrium approach (full results are available from the authors on request).21 The results are for 
models using, alternatively, current and lagged input prices both with and without assets included. 
Results are summarised for the full sample, the following sub-samples through time: 1999-2003 and 
2004-2009; and the following sub-samples by bank type: the five state owned commercial banks and 
the 43 non-state owned commercial banks.  
 
We apply the GSM-type procedure to the time period dummy variables in each model in an attempt to 
secure valid specifications and H-statistics. We report the favoured model in each case as that with the 
                                                 
20
 No specifications that are valid for inference with LN(REV) as the regressand that use the ‘two-step’ estimators and one-step 
difference estimator excluding time dummy variables (following the GSM-type procedure) could be found. In particular, all of the 
coefficients on the first lagged dependent variables (0.6926, 0.722, 0.9245, 0.8406 and 0.9236), available from the authors on request, 
fall outside of the ranges of the corresponding variable’s coefficients estimated by OLS and FE and so all of these models are regarded as 
invalid. 
21
 We also experiment to find valid specifications (and H-statistics) by excluding insignificant control variables (TC/TA, CL/CD and LN(BR)); 
treating input prices (LN(PE/TE), LN(IE/FF) and LN(CE/FA)) as endogenous variables and lastly excluding insignificant input prices. 
However, these experiment did not improve the results. 
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smallest coefficient standard error on the dependent variable in models that are valid for inference 
(according to the criteria discussed above) and well determined (in the sense that H-statistics are not 
insignificantly different from both zero and one). The models using current input prices and including 
assets suggest for the full sample and sub-samples that the Vietnamese banking system is in 
monopolistic competition. The removal of total assets from these models transforms our inference to 
suggest that the market is not significantly different from perfect competition except for the sub-
sample for state owned commercial banks, which suggests monopolistic competition (if it is not 
significantly different from being monopolistic). In the models using lagged input prices and including 
assets for the full sample with LN(REV/TA) as the dependent variable and for most samples when 
LN(INT/TA) was the regressand valid specifications and H-statistics could not be found. In the sub-
samples where valid results are available (these are the only ones reported) they generally suggest 
that the Vietnamese banking system operates in monopolistic competition (if it is close to monopoly). 
When assets are excluded from the models, our inference indicates monopoly for all samples. The 
substantial difference in the estimated coefficients (as reflected in the H-statistics) between the 
models with current and lagged input prices suggests endogeneity of current input prices. Hence we 
prefer the models using lagged input prices for inference. Further, the substantial difference in 
inference obtained from the models that include assets and those that exclude assets confirms the 
need to appropriately specify the revenue equations to exclude assets. Hence, in our analysis of sub-
samples we favour the results that include lagged input prices (to avoid endogeneity) and exclude 
assets (to avoid bias), reported in the last two columns of Table 7. The results for all of these (sub) 
samples confirms that the Vietnamese banking system operated under monopoly and that there is no 
significant change through time or in comparing state owned and non-state owned banks. 
 
Matousek et al. (2013) used the fixed-effects estimator that does not allow for dynamics in the model 
(the equilibrium approach) and reported H-statistics (being 0.45 and 0.43) for the full sample period 
1999 – 2009 that indicate monopolistic competition. This contrasts with our H-statistics that suggest a 
highly monopolistic market (-1.36 and -2.61) based upon the disequilibrium approach that does allow 
for dynamic effects.22 As we mentioned earlier, the GMM estimator is preferred for inference if the 
coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is significantly different from zero otherwise the fixed-
                                                 
22
 The H-statistics are generally higher for models where revenue is the dependent variable in our favoured models. The H-statistics for 
the full sample of data is -1.36 for the model when LN(REV) is the dependent variable and -2.61 when LN(INT) is the regressand. 
Therefore the market is more competitive when based on revenue. This is consistent with the results from the equilibrium approach 
(Matousek et al., 2013) and our expectation.  
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effects estimator (used in the equilibrium approach) should be used for inference (Roodman, 2009). 
The disequilibrium approach is preferred for inference in the Vietnamese banking system as the t-
ratios on the lagged dependent variables are statistically significant in our favoured models. Hence, 
the Vietnamese banking system behaved as if in monopoly from 1999 to 2009. 
 
That the Vietnamese banking system was in monopoly from 1999 to 2009 is consistent with Nguyen 
and Stewart (2013) and our expectation. Nguyen and Stewart (2013) found that only a few banks in 
Vietnam (most of them are SOCBs) still dominate the banking system. Although the concentration 
ratio decreased from 1999 to 2009 it still represented a high proportion of the total system in 2009 
(the 5-bank-concentration ratios for loans, assets and deposits were, respectively, 0.64, 0.57 and 0.60 
in 2009). While small banks may have performed better in the 2000s they still found it difficult to 
compete against the large and very large banks in the system in 2009. That all of these different 
assessments of the degree of competition are consistent in suggesting that the Vietnamese system 
operated under monopoly during the 1999 – 2009 period provides a robustness that makes this 
inference convincing. This should help reduce any concerns that there are exceptions to the standard 
interpretation of the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic that can call in to question inferences based upon it - see 
Spierdijk and Shaffer (2015) who derived these for the case when H > 0 (whereas our results suggest 
𝐻 ≤ 0). 
6. Conclusion 
 
We are the first to employ the non-structural model – disequilibrium approach (Goddard and Wilson, 
2009) to examine the Vietnamese banking system. This study also extends the previous literature by 
considering environmental factors such as capital/assets, loans/deposits and the number of branches 
which have not been employed in previous studies of Vietnam. Further, we employ the two different 
dependent variables: revenue divided by total assets (REV/TA) and interest income divided by total 
assets (INT/TA). This is also the first study that properly specifies the revenue equation by excluding 
assets (to avoid bias) and including lagged input prices (to avoid endogeneity) in a study of the 
Vietnamese banking system’s competitiveness. In addition, we consider the ‘system’ and ‘difference’ 
GMM estimators with both ‘one-step’ and ‘two-step’ specifications based on Arellano and Bond (1991) 
and Blundell and Bond (1998). Whilst the inclusion of time period dummy variables is supported by the 
data their presence for all periods, in addition to economic covariates, can undermine the precision of 
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coefficient estimates. Hence, in the spirit of the general-to-specific method we remove the most 
redundant time period dummy variables in an attempt to improve the efficiency of estimation and 
obtain well determined H-statistics. Results are analysed for the full sample and sub-samples of the 
data. In particular, we split the sample according to the type of bank (state owned commercial banks 
and non-state owned commercial banks) and through time (1999-2003 and 2004-2009). Our results 
use a larger sample both in terms of the number of banks and number of time periods compared to 
any previous analysis of the Vietnamese banking system. 
 
Our empirical results show that the disequilibrium approach is more appropriate than the equilibrium 
approach for inference due to the significance of the lagged dependent variable in our models. The H-
statistics from our favoured specifications for the full sample and all sub-samples are negative and 
insignificantly different from zero if they are significantly different from one. This indicates that the 
Vietnamese banking system was monopolistic between 1999 and 2009. As for the input prices, the 
unit cost of funds (LN(IE/FF)) is generally negative and significant, which suggest that the unit cost of 
funds has the most direct impact on revenue and interest income. The unit price of labour (LN(PE/TE)) 
and unit cost of fixed assets (LN(CE/FA)) are generally insignificant. The number of branches (LN(BR)) is 
positive and significant in all the models except for the sub-sample for state owned commercial banks 
suggesting that banks that open more branches increase their revenue and interest income. The other 
control variables are generally insignificant.  
 
A number of policy implications arise out of this paper. Given our finding that the Vietnamese banking 
system is monopolistic the State Bank of Vietnam (SBV) should have policies for restructuring the 
system and promoting competition in the banking sector of Vietnam. This also aligns with recent 
policies from the SBV to promote mergers and acquisitions, increasing the financial autonomy of 
banks.23 The SBV targeted 6 to 7 mergers and acquisitions in the banking sector in 2014, and a 50% 
reduction in the number of commercial banks in the period of 2015-2017 (WB, 2014). As large and 
very large banks are more efficient than small and medium-sized banks (Stewart et al., 2016), the SBV 
had encouraged big banks such as Bank for Foreign Trade of Vietnam, Bank for Investment and 
Development of Vietnam or Vietnam Bank for Industry and Trade to merge with smaller banks. This is 
                                                 
23 In 2011, Saigon Thuong Tin Commercial Bank, Tin Nghia Commercial Bank and First Commercial Bank merged resulting in positive 
performance. Habubank was approved to merge with Saigon Hanoi Commercial Bank in 2012 while Hanoi Building Commercial Bank also 
teamed up with Great Asia Commercial Bank in 2013. 
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not only to increase their size and promote economies of scale it is also to “support” each other in 
development. All weak banks with little recovery prospects will be drastically restructured even if it 
means dissolution, bankruptcy or other strong interventions (SBV, 2014).   
 
Our results also indicate that banks that open more branches enjoy increased revenue and interest 
income except for state owned commercial banks. Hence, the SBV should have policies to enhance the 
development of non-state owned commercial banks (also see Stewart et al., 2016). The recent 
restructuring plan allows the SBV to intervene in weak credit institutions, leading to the quick and 
thorough handling of these credit institutions. The SBV also focuses on non-performing loans of state 
owned commercial banks with various measures, including deciding the real estate market, solving 
inventories for enterprises and promoting the restructuring of state enterprises (SBV, 2014).24 
 
The results suggest that banks are less monopolistic when revenue is used as the dependent variable 
than when interest income is. Sources of revenue might be securities, credit cards, derivative 
products, etc while sources of interest income are almost entirely from customer loans. With lending 
limited, banks have used a variety or principles to allocate credit. Some have been allocated through 
personal relationships, some through political connections, and some by price-gauging (Maddock, 
2015). We believe that this suggests that the SBV should introduce more regulations and policies to 
enhance competition in terms of customer loans.  
 
We argue that the tightening monetary policies that started in 2008 still have a large impact on the 
banking system in terms of compulsory reserves, loans and deposits. Macroeconomic policies from the 
SBV should be used simultaneously and reasonably to meet the high demand of loans from the public 
and to control increased inflation due to a rapid increase in credit growth. The transition Vietnam is 
undertaking is complex. The role of the state is changing and so is the use of markets in the evolution 
of the society. Some combination of pushing ahead with underlying reforms while allowing growth to 
resolve some of the issues may be the appropriate path (Maddock, 2015).  
 
                                                 
24 In July 2013, the Vietnamese government established the Vietnam Asset Management Company to take bad loans off banks’ balance 
sheets through the issuing of bonds to local lenders. In addition, on 21
st
 January 2013, the government issued Circular No. 02/2013/TT-
NHNN which took effect from 2015 to further alleviate the problems of non-performing loans (NPLs). This Circular aimed to implement a 
uniform standard on treatment of NPLs through the regulation of asset classifications, method of risk provision and the use of provisions 
to further improve risks of credit institutions. 
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Table 1 The number of commercial banks from 1990 to 2009
25
 
Type of banks 1990 1995 2000 2005 2009 
State owned commercial banks  4 4 5 5 5 
Non-state owned commercial banks      
                  Joint stock commercial banks  0 36 39 37 37 
                  Branches of foreign banks  0 18 26 31 48 
                  Joint venture commercial banks  0 4 5 5 6 
                  Foreign commercial banks  0 0 0 0 5 
Total 4 62 75 78 101 
Sources: SBV (2009). 
 
Table 2. Data on loans, assets, deposits, capital and non-performing loans of the Vietnamese commercial banks (state 
owned commercial banks and non-state owned commercial banks) from 1999 to 2009 (Unit: 1,000 Vietnamese Dong) 
Year Bank type Loans Assets Deposits  Capital Non-performing 
loans 
1999 
 SOCBs     72,142,247      134,890,858       87,326,439       5,468,772  10.78% 
 Non-SOCBs     35,899,360        58,871,839       30,293,986       9,284,887  N/A 
2000 
 SOCBs   108,422,565      200,433,947     127,033,459       5,413,772  10.02% 
 Non-SOCBs     41,231,535        75,856,994       43,321,781     10,139,627  9.42% 
2001 
 SOCBs   135,647,621      247,151,769     160,738,302       5,421,134  8.83% 
 Non-SOCBs     45,466,715        88,614,974       51,759,565     10,953,034  7.81% 
2002 
 SOCBs   165,921,733      286,860,920     189,313,313     10,061,113  7.62% 
 Non-SOCBs     55,296,802      102,590,591       63,658,203     11,152,585  5.41% 
2003 
 SOCBs   214,481,096      367,813,825     237,485,761     14,516,916  5.13% 
 Non-SOCBs     74,068,790      130,337,981       79,255,399     12,398,334  3.57% 
2004 
 SOCBs   295,738,175      468,341,918     311,681,861     17,362,940  2.92% 
 Non-SOCBs   103,563,777      183,404,071     109,681,322     14,860,054  2.26% 
2005 
 SOCBs   380,850,503      603,540,889     406,957,181     18,429,980  3.81% 
 Non-SOCBs   143,449,737      261,307,537     144,499,838     20,009,805  1.42% 
2006 
 SOCBs   435,695,864      731,657,400     524,533,245     18,777,200  3.19% 
 Non-SOCBs   212,097,344      430,755,234     229,411,786     35,578,494  1.29% 
2007 
 SOCBs   564,677,195      904,004,852     652,913,108     30,091,997  1.87% 
 Non-SOCBs   420,184,441      903,961,807     456,920,152     66,066,418  0.94% 
2008 
 SOCBs   671,732,670   1,078,729,233     775,560,005     39,279,325  2.47% 
 Non-SOCBs   534,692,051   1,097,675,565     593,628,040   103,923,040  1.62% 
2009
26
 
 SOCBs   903,718,777   1,320,357,324     869,410,909     61,293,664  N/A 
 Non-SOCBs   560,883,667   1,210,244,318     680,665,451   115,192,318  N/A 
Note: SOCBs: State owned commercial banks; Non-SOCBs: Non-state owned commercial banks. Sources: Financial statements of 48 Vietnamese 
commercial banks in the period of 1999-2009. 
  
                                                 
25
 Beside these commercial banks, there are also the Social Policy Bank and Vietnam Development Bank which are operating as non-
profit institutions. 
26
 We could not collect data of the North Asia Commercial Bank and Vinasiam Bank in 2009. 
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Table 3. GMM estimations  for the full sample 
 LN(REV) LN(INT) 
 2S 2D 1S 1D 2S 2D 1S 1D 
L1 LN(REV) 0.6926*** 0.745*** 0.7498*** 0.8408***     
 (8.723) (6.541) (9.705) (10.12)     
  {0.077}       
L1 LN(INT)     0.7965*** 0.8068*** 0.8274*** 0.8525*** 
     (9.309) (6.419) (8.215) (9.393) 
     {0.0855} {0.1257} {0.1007}  
L1 LN(PE/TE) 0.0027 -0.3431 -0.0755 -0.3613* -0.1494 -0.3526** -0.1709 -0.3743*** 
 (0.0173) (-1.367) (-0.5435) (-1.931) (-1.311) (-2.143) (-1.201) (-2.936) 
L1 LN(IE/FF) -0.2195* -0.2657** -0.2404*** -0.3339*** -0.345*** -0.3986*** -0.3327*** -0.4546*** 
 (-1.774) (-2.298) (-3.077) (-4.073) (-3.416) (-3.134) (-3.651) (-4.095) 
L1 LN(CE/FA) -0.0218 0.0062 -0.005 0.0255 -0.035 0.0048 -0.0114 0.0481 
 (-0.4818) (0.1125) (-0.146) (0.527) (-0.8346) (0.0819) (-0.3096) (0.8576) 
TC/TA -0.2358 -0.5964 -0.1286 -0.2875 -0.0617 -0.2281 -0.03 -0.1817 
 (-0.8641) (-0.804) (-0.6753) (-0.6897) (-0.2982) (-0.615) (-0.1454) (-0.4959) 
CL/CD -0.0403 0.004 -0.0338 -0.0139 0.0025 0.004 -0.0061 -0.0116 
 (-0.9068) (0.0519) (-0.7207) (-0.2238) (0.0551) (0.0491) (-0.1262) (-0.1811) 
LN(BR) 0.2505*** 0.1241 0.2069*** 0.1246 0.1679** 0.1478 0.1441 0.1655 
 (3.481) (0.7777) (2.890) (1.170) (2.289) (1.079) (1.620) (1.501) 
D1999         
         
D2000 -0.4299* -0.9493* -0.4267** -0.737* -0.504*** -0.8448** -0.4894*** -0.7102** 
 (-1.815) (-1.868) (-2.308) (-1.735) (-2.626) (-2.049) (-2.747) (-2.089) 
D2001 -0.4293** -0.9305** -0.4702*** -0.7412* -0.6436*** -0.9159** -0.6152*** -0.8325*** 
 (-2.002) (-2.050) (-3.066) (-1.963) (-4.072) (-2.403) (-4.141) (-2.712) 
D2002 -0.485** -0.9387** -0.5208*** -0.75** -0.5962*** -0.8793** -0.6185*** -0.7977*** 
 (-2.403) (-2.254) (-3.357) (-2.15) (-3.992) (-2.553) (-3.801) (-2.882) 
D2003 -0.2968* -0.7392* -0.3784*** -0.5744* -0.3765*** -0.6197** -0.375*** -0.536** 
 (-1.698) (-1.802) (-2.925) (-1.74) (-3.076) (-2.052) (-3.649) (-2.053) 
D2004 -0.2909** -0.6551* -0.3509*** -0.5163* -0.3677*** -0.5513** -0.383*** -0.5145** 
 (-1.964) (-1.878) (-3.162) (-1.811) (-3.443) (-2.105) (-3.882) (-2.336) 
D2005 -0.1001 -0.4527 -0.1669 -0.3172 -0.1718 -0.3454 -0.182* -0.3048 
 (-0.7626) (-1.417) (-1.595) (-1.243) (-1.629) (-1.463) (-1.942) (-1.532) 
D2006 0.0833 -0.2349 0.0285 -0.0894 -0.0053 -0.1681 -0.0097 -0.1129 
 (0.8696) (-0.9327) (0.3349) (-0.4489) (-0.0672) (-0.8762) (-0.1313) (-0.7148) 
D2007 0.2738*** 0.0571 0.2732*** 0.1804 0.2082*** 0.0879 0.2369*** 0.1377 
 (3.373) (0.291) (4.025) (1.153) (2.628) (0.5309) (3.643) (1.054) 
D2008 0.2785*** 0.1706 0.1981*** 0.1309 0.2688*** 0.1953** 0.2222*** 0.1441* 
 (3.165) (1.561) (3.080) (1.499) (3.370) (2.000) (3.670) (1.842) 
D2009         
         
constant 2.956***  2.659***  2.076**  1.925**  
 (3.499)  (3.964)  (2.375)  (2.182)  
Instruments 34 24 34 24 34 24 34 24 
Groups 46 44 46 44 46 44 46 44 
AR(2) 0.721 Valid 0.846 Valid 0.715 Valid 0.914 Valid 0.894 Valid 0.974 Valid 0.757 Valid 0.934 Valid 
Hansen  0.110 Valid 0.048 
Invalid 
0.110 Valid 0.048 
Invalid 
0.107 Valid 0.127 Valid 0.107 Valid 0.127 Valid 
H0 period FE 82.83*** 
[0.0000] 
Reject 
103.09*** 
[0.0000] 
Reject 
130.87*** 
[0.0000] 
Reject 
123.17*** 
[0.0000] 
Reject 
186.74*** 
[0.0000] 
Reject 
129.76*** 
[0.0000] 
Reject 
169.11*** 
[0.0000] 
Reject 
149.80*** 
[0.0000] 
Reject 
L1 OLS 0.8256 0.8256 0.8256 0.8256 0.8420 0.8420 0.8420 0.8420 
L1 period FE 0.7168 0.7168 0.7168 0.7168 0.7642 0.7642 0.7642 0.7642 
H-statistic 
 
  -1.2825 
 
 -2.6010 
 
-3.8623 
 
-2.9842 
 
 
H=0   -1.1217 
Accept 
 -1.3888 
Accept 
-1.2154 
Accept 
-1.0133 
Accept 
 
H=1   -2.000*** 
Reject 
 -1.9228 
Accept 
-1.5301 
Accept 
-1.3529 
Accept 
 
Wald test 8647.12*** 2272.69*** 12389.79*** 3786.45*** 8320.55*** 2154.35*** 13839.51*** 3386.83*** 
Obs. 327 280 327 280 327 280 327 280 
Note: Coefficients, t-statistics (round brackets), standard errors (braces) and probabilities (square brackets) are reported in the table; *** indicates 
significance at the 1% level, ** significance at the 5% level, * significance at the 10% level. Sources: Financial statements of 48 Vietnamese commercial 
banks from 1999 to 2009; 2S denotes the two-step system estimator; 2D the two-step difference estimator; 1S the one-step system estimator; 1D the one-
step difference estimator. Sources: Financial statements of 48 Vietnamese commercial banks in the period of 1999-2009. 
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Table 4. GMM estimations  for the full sample (LN(INT), one-step system estimator) 
 1S 
L1 LN(INT) 0.8274*** 0.8274*** 0.8261*** 
 (8.215) (8.215) (8.454) 
 {0.1007} {0.1007} {0.0977} 
L1 LN(PE/TE) -0.1709 -0.1709 -0.1668 
 (-1.201) (-1.201) (-1.343) 
L1 LN(IE/FF) -0.3327*** -0.3327*** -0.33*** 
 (-3.651) (-3.651) (-3.889) 
L1 LN(CE/FA) -0.0114 -0.0114 -0.0115 
 (-0.3096) (-0.3096) (-0.3131) 
TC/TA -0.030 -0.030 -0.0325 
 (-0.1454) (-0.1454) (-0.1591) 
CL/CD -0.0061 -0.0061 -0.0062 
 (-0.1262) (-0.1262) (-0.1289) 
LN(BR) 0.1441 0.1441 0.1456* 
 (1.620) (1.620) (1.705) 
D1999    
    
D2000 -0.4894*** -0.4797*** -0.4793*** 
 (-2.747) (-3.456) (-3.422) 
D2001 -0.6152*** -0.6056*** -0.6056*** 
 (-4.141) (-5.309) (-5.235) 
D2002 -0.6185*** -0.6089*** -0.6094*** 
 (-3.801) (-5.015) (-4.879) 
D2003 -0.375*** -0.3653*** -0.3661*** 
 (-3.649) (-6.165) (-5.800) 
D2004 -0.383*** -0.3733*** -0.3748*** 
 (-3.882) (-6.581) (-6.116) 
D2005 -0.182* -0.1723*** -0.1738*** 
 (-1.942) (-3.637) (-3.150) 
D2006 -0.0097   
 (-0.1313)   
D2007 0.2369*** 0.2466*** 0.2437*** 
 (3.643) (4.065) (4.750) 
D2008 0.2222*** 0.2318*** 0.2277*** 
 (3.670) (4.386) (5.313) 
D2009  0.0097  
  (0.1313)  
constant 1.925** 1.916** 1.923** 
 (2.182) (2.163) (2.180) 
H0 redundant 
period 
dummies -- 
0.020 
[0.8956] 
Accept 
0.020 
[0.8956] 
Accept 
Instruments 34 34 33 
Groups 46 46 46 
AR(2) 0.757 Valid 0.757 Valid 0.752 Valid 
Hansen  0.107 Valid 0.107 Valid 0.111 Valid 
H0 period FE 169.11*** 
[0.0000] 
Reject 
169.11*** 
[0.0000] 
Reject 
152.89*** 
[0.0000] 
Reject 
L1 OLS 0.8420 0.8420 0.8443 
L1 period FE 0.7642 0.7642 0.7650 
H-statistic 
 
-2.9842 
 
-2.9842 
 
-2.9227 
 
H=0 -1.0133 
Accept 
-1.0133 
Accept 
-1.0779 
Accept 
H=1 -1.3529 
Accept 
-1.3529 
Accept 
-1.4468 
Accept 
Wald test 13839.51 13839.51 13164.57 
Obs. 327 327 327 
See notes to Table 3. 
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Table 5. GMM estimations  for the full sample (LN(INT), ‘two-step’ estimators) 
 2D 2S 
L1 LN(INT) 0.8068*** 0.8068*** 0.7724*** 0.7965*** 0.7965*** 0.7983*** 
 (6.419) (6.419) (6.239) (9.309) (9.309) (9.156) 
 {0.1257} {0.1257} {0.1238} {0.0855} {0.0855} {0.0872} 
L1 LN(PE/TE) -0.3526** -0.3526 -0.381** -0.1494 -0.1494 -0.145 
 (-2.143) (-2.143) (-2.23) (-1.311) (-1.311) (-1.566) 
L1 LN(IE/FF) -0.3986*** -0.3986*** -0.3874** -0.345*** -0.345*** -0.3457*** 
 (-3.134) (-3.134) (-2.421) (-3.416) (-3.416) (-3.799) 
L1 LN(CE/FA) 0.0048 0.0048 0.0226 -0.035 -0.035 -0.0362 
 (0.0819) (0.0819) (0.4465) (-0.8346) (-0.8346) (-0.8774) 
TC/TA -0.2281 -0.2281 -0.367 -0.0617 -0.0617 -0.0582 
 (-0.615) (-0.615) (-0.8333) (-0.2982) (-0.2982) (-0.2708) 
CL/CD 0.004 0.004 -0.0234 0.0025 0.0025 0.005 
 (0.0491) (0.0491) (-0.2965) (0.0551) (0.0551) (0.1085) 
LN(TA)       
       
LN(BR) 0.1478 0.1478 0.1406 0.1679** 0.1679** 0.1664** 
 (1.079) (1.079) (0.9329) (2.289) (2.289) (2.222) 
D1999       
       
D2000 -0.8448** -0.9328*** -1.017*** -0.504*** -0.4987*** -0.492*** 
 (-2.049) (-3.481) (-6.061) (-2.626) (-3.401) (-3.533) 
D2001 -0.9159** -1.004*** -1.074*** -0.6436*** -0.6383*** -0.6335*** 
 (-2.403) (-4.110) (-6.267) (-4.072) (-5.241) (-5.283) 
D2002 -0.8793** -0.9672*** -1.024*** -0.5962*** -0.591*** -0.5888*** 
 (-2.553) (-4.846) (-7.956) (-3.992) (-6.007) (-6.379) 
D2003 -0.6197** -0.7077*** -0.7565*** -0.3765*** -0.3713*** -0.3672*** 
 (-2.052) (-4.356) (-6.317) (-3.076) (-4.467) (-4.305) 
D2004 -0.5513** -0.6393*** -0.6768*** -0.3677*** -0.3625*** -0.3604*** 
 (-2.105) (-5.002) (-6.433) (-3.443) (-5.432) (-5.264) 
D2005 -0.3454 -0.4334*** -0.457*** -0.1718 -0.1665*** -0.1642*** 
 (-1.463) (-4.663) (-6.591) (-1.629) (-2.901) (-2.768) 
D2006 -0.1681 -0.2561*** -0.258*** -0.0053   
 (-0.8762) (-4.556) (-4.988) (-0.0672)   
D2007 0.0879   0.2082*** 0.2135*** 0.2158*** 
 (0.5309)   (2.628) (3.955) (4.213) 
D2008 0.1953** 0.1074 0.1613** 0.2688*** 0.2741*** 0.2723*** 
 (2.000) (0.8954) (2.156) (3.370) (4.510) (4.853) 
D2009  -0.0879   0.0053  
  (-0.5309)   (0.0672)  
constant    2.076** 2.071** 2.027** 
    (2.375) (2.389) (2.271) 
H0 redundant 
period 
dummies -- 
0.28 
[0.5955] 
Accept 
0.0000 
[0.9464] 
Accept -- 
0.0000 
[0.9464] 
Accept 
0.0000 
[0.9464] 
Accept 
Instruments 24 24 23 34 34 33 
Groups 44 44 44 46 46 46 
AR(2) 0.974 Valid 0.974 Valid 0.872 Valid 0.894 Valid 0.894 Valid 0.884 Valid 
Hansen  0.127 Valid 0.127 Valid 0.115 Valid 0.107 Valid 0.107 Valid 0.111 Valid 
H0 period FE 129.76*** 
[0.0000] 
Reject 
129.76*** 
[0.0000] 
Reject 
107.61*** 
[0.0000] 
Reject 
186.74*** 
[0.0000] 
Reject 
186.74*** 
[0.0000] 
Reject 
158.88*** 
[0.0000] 
Reject 
L1 OLS 0.8420 0.8420 0.8461 0.8420 0.8420 0.8443 
L1 period FE 0.7642 0.7642 0.7251 0.7642 0.7642 0.7651 
H-statistic 
 
-3.8623 
 
-3.8623 
 
-3.2771 
 
-2.6010 
 
-2.6010 
 
-2.6128 
 
H=0 -1.2154 
Accept 
-1.2154 
Accept 
-1.1731 
Accept 
-1.3888 
Accept 
-1.3888 
Accept 
-1.4554 
Accept 
H=1 -1.5301 
Accept 
-1.5301 
Accept 
-1.5310 
Accept 
-1.9228 
Accept 
-1.9228 
Accept 
--2.0124*** 
Reject 
Wald test 2154.35 2154.35 1775.93 8320.55 8320.55 8168.67 
Obs. 280 280 280 327 327 327 
See notes to Table 3. 
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Table 6. GMM estimations  for the full sample (LN(REV), one-step system estimator) 
 1S 
L1 LN(REV) 0.7498*** 0.7498*** 0.7523*** 
 (9.705) (9.705) (9.967) 
 {0.077} {0.077} {0.075} 
L1 LN(PE/TE) -0.0755 -0.0755 -0.0857 
 (-0.5435) (-0.5435) (-0.7076) 
L1 LN(IE/FF) -0.2404*** -0.2404*** -0.2467*** 
 (-3.077) (-3.077) (-3.448) 
L1 LN(CE/FA) -0.005 -0.005 -0.0048 
 (-0.146) (-0.146) (-0.1388) 
TC/TA -0.1286 -0.1286 -0.1261 
 (-0.6753) (-0.6753) (-0.6586) 
CL/CD -0.0338 -0.0338 -0.0331 
 (-0.7207) (-0.7207) (-0.7076) 
LN(BR) 0.2069*** 0.2069*** 0.204*** 
 (2.89) (2.89) (2.957) 
D1999    
    
D2000 -0.4267** -0.4553*** -0.4529*** 
 (-2.308) (-3.338) (-3.251) 
D2001 -0.4702*** -0.4987*** -0.4953*** 
 (-3.066) (-4.713) (-4.553) 
D2002 -0.5208*** -0.5493*** -0.5451*** 
 (-3.357) (-4.943) (-4.774) 
D2003 -0.3784*** -0.4069*** -0.402*** 
 (-2.925) (-5.338) (-4.924) 
D2004 -0.3509*** -0.3795*** -0.3725*** 
 (-3.162) (-6.500) (-5.75) 
D2005 -0.1669 -0.1955*** -0.187*** 
 (-1.595) (-3.659) (-3.073) 
D2006 0.0285   
 (0.3349)   
D2007 0.2732*** 0.2447*** 0.257*** 
 (4.025) (3.515) (4.644) 
D2008 0.1981*** 0.1696** 0.1829*** 
 (3.080) (2.475) (3.559) 
D2009  -0.0285  
  (-0.3349)  
constant 2.659*** 2.687*** 2.675*** 
 (3.964) (4.049) (4.006) 
H0 redundant 
period dummies 
-- 
0.11 
[0.7377] 
Accept 
0.11 
[0.7377] 
Accept 
Instruments 34 34 33 
Groups 46 46 46 
AR(2) 0.715 Valid 0.715 Valid 0.744 Valid 
Hansen  0.110 Valid 0.110 Valid 0.081 Valid* 
H0 period FE 130.87*** 
[0.0000] 
Reject 
130.87*** 
[0.0000] 
Reject 
89.19*** 
[0.0000] 
Reject 
L1 OLS 0.8256 0.8256 0.8279 
L1 period FE 0.7168 0.7168 0.7157 
H-statistic 
 
-1.2825 
 
-1.2825 
 
-1.3613 
 
H=0 -1.1217 
Accept 
-1.1217 
Accept 
-1.2744 
Accept 
H=1 -2.000*** 
Reject 
-2.000*** 
Reject 
-2.2106*** 
Reject 
Wald test 12389.79 12389.79 12340.62 
Obs. 327 327 327 
See notes to Table 3. 
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Table 7. Summary of results from the non-structural model (disequilibrium approach) 
 Current input prices Lagged input prices 
With assets Without assets With assets Without assets 
LN(REV/TA) LN(INT/TA) LN(REV) LN(INT) LN(REV/TA) LN(INT/TA) LN(REV) LN(INT) 
Full sample Est. 1D 1D 1D 1S N/A N/A 1S 2S 
1999-2009 L1 0.1679** 
(2.573) 
{0.0652} 
0.1572** 
(2.392) 
{0.0657} 
0.6178*** 
(9.421) 
{0.0655} 
0.6135*** 
(10.97) 
{0.0559} 
  0.7523*** 
(9.97) 
{0.075} 
0.7983*** 
(9.16) 
{0.0872} 
 H-sta. 0.8265 0.9449 1.0640 1.2725   -1.3613 -2.6128 
 H=0 4.1443*** 
Reject 
6.8143*** 
Reject 
3.7042*** 
Reject 
5.0140*** 
Reject 
  -1.2744 
Accept 
-1.4554 
Accept 
 H=1 -0.8698 
Accept 
-0.3972 
Accept 
0.2229 
Accept 
1.0737 
Accept 
  -2.2106*** 
Reject 
-2.0124*** 
Reject 
non-SOCBs  Est. 1D 1S 1S 1S 1S N/A 1S 2S 
1999-2009 L1 0.055 
(0.7441) 
{0.0739} 
0.0821* 
(1.666) 
{0.0492} 
0.5791*** 
(9.666) 
{0.0599} 
0.6093*** 
(10.51) 
{0.058} 
0.0454 
(0.63) 
{0.072}  
0.7658*** 
(11.21) 
{0.0683} 
0.7909*** 
(13.54) 
{0.058} 
 H-sta. 0.5471 0.6740 1.2902 1.4810 0.1145  -1.6834 -2.5720 
 H=0 3.0441*** 
Reject 
8.6154*** 
Reject 
6.1134*** 
Reject 
5.4463*** 
Reject 
1.3217 
Accept 
 -1.3184 
Accept 
-1.7938 
Accept 
 H=1 -2.5202*** 
Reject 
-4.1676*** 
Reject 
1.3750 
Accept 
1.7689 
Accept 
-10.219*** 
Reject 
 -2.1016*** 
Reject 
-2.4912*** 
Reject 
SOCBs Est. 2S 2D 1S 1S 2S N/A 1S 2S 
1999-2009 L1 0.0963 
(1.135) 
{0.0848} 
0.1819* 
(1.832) 
{0.099} 
0.6066*** 
(10.67) 
{0.0568} 
0.6207*** 
(8.943) 
{0.0694} 
0.075 
(0.96) 
{0.078}  
0.7545*** 
(10.6) 
{0.0711} 
0.7957*** 
(10.35) 
{0.077} 
 H-sta. 0.6125 0.4936 0.0868 0.2288 0.2866  -1.5271 -2.2966 
 H=0 4.3020*** 
Reject 
2.1338*** 
Reject 
0.2689 
Accept 
0.5936 
Accept 
3.3697*** 
Reject 
 -1.7739 
Accept 
-1.8146 
Accept 
 H=1 -2.7217*** 
Reject 
-2.1889*** 
Reject 
-2.828*** 
Reject 
-2.0006*** 
Reject 
-8.3860*** 
Reject 
 -2.9355*** 
Reject 
-2.6047*** 
Reject 
Sub-sample Est. 1S 1S 2S 2S 2S N/A N/A 2S 
1999-2003 L1 0.0185 
(0.1761) 
{0.105} 
0.0106 
(0.0589) 
{0.1331} 
0.5845*** 
(8.94) 
{0.0654} 
0.6000*** 
(8.39) 
{0.0715} 
0.0315 
(0.42) 
{0.075}  
 0.7918*** 
(14.94) 
{0.053} 
 H-sta. 0.1539 0.4001 1.9898 2.5466 0.1378   -1.3478 
 H=0 1.1661 
Accept 
3.0838*** 
Reject 
3.0198*** 
 Reject 
3.2122*** 
 Reject 
1.3475 
Accept 
  -1.1735 
Accept 
 H=1 -6.4120*** 
Reject 
-4.6231*** 
Reject 
1.5021 
Accept 
1.9508 
Accept 
-8.4281*** 
Reject 
  -2.0441*** 
Reject 
Sub-sample Est. 2S 2S 1S 1S 2S 1S 2S 2S 
2004-2009 L1 0.0385 
(0.7774) 
{0.0495} 
-0.0494 
(-1.634) 
{0.030} 
0.5976*** 
(10.21) 
{0.0585} 
0.6*** 
(10.25) 
{0.0586} 
0.0315 
(0.42) 
{0.075} 
-0.0076 
(-0.1075) 
{0.0706} 
0.7303*** 
(11.06) 
{0.066} 
0.7686*** 
(13.49) 
{0.057} 
 H-sta. 0.6712 0.6600 0.6697 0.7812 0.1949 0.1941 -1.9988 -2.7293 
 H=0 9.8178*** 
Reject 
9.7552*** 
Reject 
2.1682*** 
Reject 
2.6840*** 
Reject 
2.1160*** 
Reject 
3.3054*** 
Reject 
-1.4462 
Accept 
-1.7821 
Accept 
 H=1 -4.8092*** 
Reject 
-5.0256*** 
Reject 
-1.0692 
Accept 
0.7516 
Accept 
-8.7418*** 
Reject 
-13.7224*** 
Reject 
-2.1698*** 
Reject 
-2.435*** 
Reject 
See note to Table 3. 
